Scanlan et al. 1 provide an important contribution to the discussion surrounding informed consent for hematopoietic cell transplantation (HCT), rightly noting that HCT is high risk and complex, and that patients who might consider HCT are vulnerable and often have limited treatment options. While we agree with Scanlan et al. 1 that the informed consent process and accompanying information disclosure can, as the authors argue, 'provide a 'space' in which a relationship of trust could flourish', 1 we worry that given the vulnerable state in which patients consent to HCT, trust without understanding could have negative consequences, particularly for those patients who may be cured of the underlying primary disease by the HCT, but may have permanent negative consequences (e.g. chronic graft-versus-host disease), or those who will not be cured, and, in hindsight, would have chosen to discontinue treatment and pursue palliative care sooner.
As we note in our original article, 2 trust is an important factor in the decision-making process regarding HCT. We do not suggest that the decision-making process should rely solely on education, enhancing comprehension or better consent forms, nor that trust is not essential. Quite the contrary, we argue that trust is an important factor, but cannot take the place of informed consent. In fact, we argued that, 'depending on the degree of control the patient wishes to exert, the informed consent process can serve as a mutual trust-building exercise between the patient and physician', 2 as patients place a high emphasis on trust in their physicians, particularly in the context of BMT. We further argue that this need not be seen as unjustifiably paternalistic, as patients may autonomously choose to act on the guidance of a trusted physician. It is essential though that this decision is left to patients. An over-reliance on trust, at the expense of informed consent, is problematic because it may raise serious legal concerns, it is not clear what would ground physician recommendations and it may lead to patient regret in an already vulnerable population.
Legally, consent has the purpose of assuring that the patient has given permission for the procedure and been informed about the procedure, risks and alternatives, including forgoing treatment. Trust is important, and trusting patients may waive their right to informed consent, so a trusting patient can choose to declare 'I trust you, do what you think is best'. However, under US law and generally accepted ethics standards, patients have the legal right to consent or refuse 3 offered treatment and to be provided the 'material' information to make the decision. 4 Life-threatening situations may lead some patients to put more weight on trust. Even if the choice is life or death, some patients will also want to know the information about HCT and its side effects and risks, what will unfold if the HCT is unsuccessful, and even if they don't know about it, what palliative care might be able to provide if they forgo the treatment or the treatment is unsuccessful. A reliance on trust at the expense of informed consent risks missing such important conversations.
If the decision to pursue HCT is not based on informed consent, and the patient does not understand what HCT entails but merely trusts his or her physician, the risk of regret becomes more stark. As a recent study demonstrated, almost 15% of long-term survivors of localized prostate cancer expressed some level of regret over their treatment choice. 5 The authors of that study define regret as stemming from uncertainty regarding the best treatment decision and a later, unfavorable outcome results in a belief that another treatment decision might have been better. The authors conclude that 'better informing men about treatment options, in particular, conservative treatment, might help mitigate long-term regret'. 5 Decisional regret can be particularly important in the HCT setting as patients may have to live with significant, even life-threatening, long-term consequences of HCT for the remainder of their lives.
If, as the authors conclude, the 'real purpose of consent is not to educate the patient but to build a trusting relationship with the attending health-care professionals, thus facilitating a negotiated setting within which HCT can be performed, 1 it is difficult to see what foundation would support this negotiation. If patients do not understand HCT, how can they make an informed decision to pursue HCT? They may give their consent, but this consent would not be informed. Perhaps more troubling, what would the basis for treatment recommendations from physicians be? Without the patient's understanding of HCT and his or her preferences, would physicians merely recommend what they think the patient ought to do based on their incomplete knowledge of the patient's values? Trust may not be warranted, unless the physician understands the patient's values. The informed consent discussion gives an opportunity for the physician to learn-or confirm-that understanding, which can increase the warrant for the patient's trust.
